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ABSTRACT
Background Declines in employment protection may
have disproportionate effects on employment
opportunities of workers with low education and poorer
health. This study investigates the impact of changes in
employment protection levels on employment rates
according to education and health in 23 European
countries.
Methods Data were taken from the 4-year rotating
panel European Union Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions study. Employed participants aged
29–59 years (n = 334 999) were followed for 1 year over
an 11-year period, from 2003 up to 2014. A logistic
regression model with country and period fixed effects
was used to estimate the association between changes in
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) employment protection index and
labour market outcomes, incorporating interaction terms
with education and health.
Results 15 of the 23 countries saw their level of
employment protection decline between 2003 and 2014.
Reduced employment protection of temporary workers
increased odds of early retirement (OR 6.29, 95% CI 3.17
to 12.48) and unemployment (OR 1.37, 95% CI 1.07 to
1.76). Reduced employment protection of permanent
workers increased odds of early retirement more among
workers in poor health (OR 4.46, 95% CI 2.26 to 8.78)
than among workers in good health (OR 2.58, 95% CI
1.30 to 5.10). The impact of reduced employment
protection of temporary workers on unemployment was
stronger among lower-educated workers (OR 1.47, 95%
CI 1.13 to 1.90) than among higher-educated workers
(OR 1.21, 95% CI 0.95 to 1.54).
Conclusion Reduced employment protection increased
the odds of early exit from paid employment, especially
among workers with lower education and poorer health.
Employment protection laws may help reduce the
employment disadvantage of workers with low education
and poorer health.
INTRODUCTION
Employment protection legislation (EPL) was
designed to protect jobs and increase job stability,
as well as to prevent the negative consequences of
job loss for workers and their families.1 Since the
1990s, many European countries have implemented
reforms to their EPL systems, aimed at ‘flexibilisa-
tion’ or ‘deregulation’ of the labour market.1 As
a result, the proportion of temporary workers has
increased, while the employment protection of per-
manent workers has remained largely unchanged.2 3
A common argument in favour of reduced EPL is
that making it easier to fire workers would increase
employment and boost future economic growth,
because firms may be more likely to hire employees
if they have more flexibility in dismissing them.1
However, this has resulted in segmentation of the
labour market, whereby outsiders tend to move
from one temporary contract to another while insi-
ders enjoy high protection and stability.4
One assumption behind EPL flexibilisation is that
it reduces labour market inefficiencies, increasing
overall employment and improving the overall well-
being of workers.1 Consistently, some studies sug-
gest that paid employment is associated with better
health,5 while exit from paid employment is asso-
ciated with deterioration of health.6–11 On the one
hand, EPL flexibilisation that reduces employment
protection may also increase the risk that vulnerable
workers, particularly those in poor health or with
less education, exit paid employment,12–16 perpetu-
ating the employment gap of workers by education
and health status.17
In some European countries, such as the United
Kingdom, poor health is considered by law
a potential cause for dismissal.18 By contrast, in
countries such as the Netherlands, legislation tightly
regulates the dismissal of workers for health
reasons.19 Earlier studies suggest that there has
been an increased risk of exit from paid employment
among workers with health limitations and chronic
illnesses in response to reduced employment
protection.20 21 Two European studies found that
higher employment protection is associated with
a smaller employment gap between healthy and
unhealthy persons.17 22 A limitation of these studies
is that they rely on cross-country variation in
employment protection levels, making it difficult
to control for the impact of other characteristics
that vary across countries. So far, no studies have
examined the impact of changes in employment
protection levels within countries on labour market
outcomes according to health and educational level.
Lower-educated workers more often have
employment contracts with flexible working hours
and short-term temporary contracts compared with
higher-educated workers.23 An earlier study showed
that lower-educated workers were more likely to
exit paid employment through unemployment, dis-
ability and economic inactivity but were less likely to
exit paid employment into early retirement, com-
pared with higher-educated workers.21 Reduction






















of employment protection may increase exit from paid employ-
ment through different pathways among lower- and higher-
educated workers. However, no studies have examined this ques-
tion exploiting changes in employment protection across
countries.
The aim of this study was to assess the impact of changes in
employment protection on exit from paid employment through
different pathways among workers in European countries. We
hypothesised that reforms which reduced employment protec-
tion in pursuit of higher labour market flexibility disproportio-
nately increased the risk of exit from paid employment among
workers with lower education and poorer health.17 24 25
METHODS
Design and study population
Longitudinal data from 2003 to 2014 were obtained from the
4-year rotating panel ‘European Union Statistics on Income and
Living Conditions’ (EU-SILC), in which 25% of the sample is
newly recruited and 25% is dropped each year. Data from 23 EU-
countries that participated between 2003 and 2014 were avail-
able. Details on modalities of data collection, comparability of
data between countries and over time, response levels and any
other question concerning the quality of data are provided by the
official EU-SILC documentation and are freely available.26
For the purpose of this study, our sample includes individuals in
paid-employment, aged between 30 and 59 years, with available
information on self-rated health at the year of enrolment in the
study and on their employment status at 1-year follow-up. Our age
selection is motivated by our interest to capture exit from paid
employment prior to the Statutory Pension Age. To ensure that
workers finished education, participants chosen were aged at least
30 years. A follow-up period of 1 year was used instead of the
maximum follow-up period of 4 years in the EU-SILC longitudinal
cohort, because employment protection level may change in
a country from year to year. Each year, from 2003 until 2013,
a representative sample of the employed population in a country
was followed for 1 year. This longitudinal cohort was used to
investigate the influence of yearly changes in country-specific indi-
cators of employment protection on paid employment among
permanent and temporary workers. Our sample includes 334 999
participants with available information on the variables of interests.
Employment status
The labour force status was self-reported by respondents at each
wave and classified into six mutually exclusive categories:
employment (employee or self-employed, full-time or part-
time), disability (unfit to work, permanently disabled), unem-
ployment, retirement, economic inactivity (fulfilling domestic
tasks and care responsibilities and other inactivity) and other (in
military service, student). Based on the self-reported employment
status at 1-year follow-up, four different pathways out of paid
employment were defined: disability, unemployment, retirement
and economic inactivity. We generated an additional variable
capturing all of the above pathways (‘exit from paid employment
through all pathways’). Participants who left paid employment
due to other reasons (military service or education) were
excluded from the study (1.0% of total study population).
Self-rated health
Self-rated health of all participants at baseline was used.
Participants were asked to rate their own general health on
a 5-point scale, ranging from ‘very good’, ‘good’, ‘fair’ and
‘bad’ to ‘very bad’. Those reporting less than ‘good health’ were
defined as having poor self-rated health.27
Educational level
Participants were divided into three groups according to their
level of educational attainment on the basis of the International
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-97): high educa-
tion was defined as higher vocational training or university
(ISCED 5–6), intermediate education was defined as higher sec-
ondary and intermediate vocational training (ISCED 3–4) and
low education was defined as lower secondary education, pri-
mary and pre-primary education (ISCED 0–2).28
Gross domestic product
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at market prices is
defined as the expenditure on final goods and services minus
imports, and represents the economic performance of
a country. GDP is expressed in US$ per capita, constant prices
and purchasing power parity, indexed to inflation and exchange
rates. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) database of GDP per country per year is
available online.29
Employment protection legislation
Individual-level data from the EU-SILC were linked to country-
and year-level data on two key indicators of EPL constructed by
the OECD.30 These indicators measure the procedures and costs
involved in dismissing individuals or groups of workers and the
procedures involved in hiring workers on fixed-term or tempor-
ary work agency contracts. The indicators have been built using
the OECD Secretariat’s own reading of statutory laws, collective
bargaining agreements and case law as well as contributions from
officials from OECDmember countries and advice from country
experts.30 Based on the OECD classification, two indicators of
EPL were included in the current study: individual and collective
dismissals of workers with permanent contracts (eprc_v2) and
regulation of temporary contracts (ept_v1). These indicators
typically aremeasured on a cardinal scale from 0 to 6, with higher
scores implying more stringent procedures and higher costs
involved in individual or collective dismissal of workers with
permanent contracts (eprc_v2), or more stringent regulations of
temporary contracts (ept_v1)31 (online supplementary tables S1
and S2).
Statistical analysis
This longitudinal cohort was used to investigate the influence of
yearly changes in country-specific indicators of employment pro-
tection on paid employment among permanent and temporary
workers. To analyse the association between changes in employ-
ment protection level and the probability of exit from paid
employment, the following pooled logistic regression model with
fixed effects for country and year was used: Log(pijt/(1-pijt)) = β0+
β1Ejt + β2Xijt + β3Gjt + β4Cj + β5Tt + εijt, where i represents
a person, j represents a country and t represents time. p=the
probability that the outcome measure is equal to 1 (=exit from
paid employment), E=employment protection level,
X=individual characteristics (age, sex, education, health),
G=GDP for each country in each year, C=a set of dummy
variables representing country fixed effects and T= a set
of dummy variables representing period (year) fixed effects.
β0=intercept, β1=parameter indicating the association between
changes in employment protection and exit from paid






















employment, β2=parameters indicating the association
between individual characteristics and exit from paid employ-
ment, β3=parameter indicating the association between GDP
and exit from paid employment, β4 and β5=parameters indi-
cating differences in probability to exit paid employment
between countries and years and ε=error term. This analyti-
cal technique (with fixed effects for country and year)
removes confounding by unmeasured time-invariant country
characteristics and unmeasured common trends across all
countries, and essentially quantifies the association between
changes in employment protection and the probability to exit
paid employment, net of country differences and common
time trends. Analyses were done for total exit from paid
employment as well as for each pathway out of paid employ-
ment. For each pathway, one reference group consisted of
persons who continued to be employed or left employment
through another pathway. ORs with corresponding 95% CIs
were calculated as measure of association. In all analyses, SEs
were clustered at the country level.
The association between changes in employment protection
level and exit from paid employment among workers in poor
versus good health was analysed by including an interaction term
of individual health and employment protection level in the
model. The following model was used:
Log(pijt/(1-pijt)) = β0+ β1Ejt + β2healthijt + β3healthijt*Ejt+ β4
Xijt + β5Gjt + β6Cj + β7Tt + εijt
The difference between healthy and unhealthy workers in the
association between changes in employment protection and exit
from paid employment was estimated by β3. The effect of changes
in employment protection among healthy workers (dichotomous
variable for health coded 0 for good health and 1 for poor health)
or among unhealthy workers (dichotomous variable for health
coded 0 for poor health and 1 for good health) was estimated by
β1. In addition, the association between changes in employment
protection and exit from paid employment among lower-, inter-
mediate- and higher-educated workers was analysed by including
a cross-level interaction term between educational level and
employment protection level in the model. All analyses were
performed using Stata statistical software V.14 (StataCorp).
RESULTS
Employment protection of permanent workers decreased in 14
of 23 European countries, with the largest decrease being
observed in Portugal (from 4.0 to 2.8), Slovakia (from 2.2 to
1.7) and Greece (from 2.9 to 2.4). Employment protection of
workers with temporary contracts decreased in five European
countries and increased in three European countries. The largest
decrease in employment protection of temporary workers was
observed in Greece (from 4.8 to 2.3), whereas the largest increase
was found in Estonia (from 1.9 to 3.0) (figure 1 and online
supplementary table S3).
The upper panel of table 1 shows the association between
individual characteristics and exit from paid employment
through different pathways. Lower-educated workers were
more likely to exit paid employment via disability status (OR
2.81, 95% CI 2.34 to 3.36), unemployment status (OR 2.70,
95% CI 2.28 to 3.20), early retirement (OR 1.31, 95% CI 1.01
to 1.69) and economic inactivity (OR 2.18, 95%CI 1.77 to 2.67)
compared with higher-educated persons. In addition, respon-
dents in poorer health had higher likelihood of transitioning
from paid employment into disability status (OR 7.17, 95% CI
5.72 to 8.99), unemployment status (OR 1.51, 95% CI 1.40 to
1.63), early retirement (OR 1.12, 95% CI 0.93 to 1.34) and
economic inactivity (OR 1.22, 95% CI 1.12 to 1.33) compared
with respondents in good health.
The lower panel of table 1 shows the influence of changes in
employment protection on exit from paid employment based on
a regression model including fixed effects for country and year.
Reduced employment protection for permanent workers in
European countries increased the likelihood of transitions into
Figure 1 Change in employment protection level in 23 European countries between 2003 and 2014. A decrease (⊲), an increase (⊳), or no change (•) in
employment protection level in European countries. The largest decrease in employment protection of permanent workers was found in Portugal (from
4.0 to 2.8), whereas the largest decrease in employment protection of temporary workers was found in Greece (from 4.8 to 2.3).






















early retirement (OR 3.45, 95%CI 1.76 to 6.76). Reduced employ-
ment protection for permanent workers was not associated with
other pathways of exit from paid employment. Less employment
protection for temporary workers increased the likelihood to exit
from paid employment (OR 1.58, 95%CI 1.20 to 2.09), due to the
increased likelihood of early retirement (OR 6.29, 95% CI 3.17 to
12.48) and unemployment (OR 1.37, 95% CI 1.07 to 1.76).
Table 2 illustrates the results based on the regression analyses
including the interaction term between health and employment
protection. Reduced employment protection for permanent work-
ers increased the risk of exit from paid employment more among
workers in poor health comparedwithworkers in good health. This
is particularly the case for early exit due to retirement. A reduction
in employment protection increased the odds of retirement more
amongworkers in poor health (OR4.46, 95%CI 2.26 to 8.78) than
among workers in good health (OR 2.58, 95% CI 2.00 to 3.32),
with a statistically significant interaction effect between health and
employment protection of 1.73 (95%CI 1.39 to 2.15), as shown in
online supplementary table S4. A reduction in employment protec-
tion for temporary workers increased the risk of exit from paid
employment amongworkers in poor health (OR1.63, 95%CI 1.23
to 2.16) aswell as amongworkers in good health (OR1.56, 95%CI
1.23 to 2.16) (table 2 and online supplementary table S4).
Table 3 illustrates the results based on the regression analyses
including the interaction term between education and employ-
ment protection. When employment protection for permanent
workers was reduced, higher-educated workers were less likely to
become unemployed (OR 0.67, 95% CI 0.34 to 1.30) compared
with lower-educated workers (OR 0.97, 95% CI 0.46 to 2.04),
with an interaction effect between education and employment
protection of 1.45 (95% CI 1.00 to 2.12), as shown in online
supplementary table S5. Similarly, a reduction in employment
protection for temporary workers increased the risk of becoming
unemployed more among lower-educated workers (OR 1.47,
95% CI 1.13 to 1.90) than among higher-educated workers
(OR 1.21, 95% CI 0.95 to 1.54), with an interaction effect
between education and employment protection of 1.21 (95%
CI 1.02 to 1.45) (table 3 and online supplementary table S5).
DISCUSSION
The majority of the 23 European countries included in our study
reformed employment protection legislations between 2003 and
2014, and most of these reforms reduced the level of employ-
ment protection. Reduced employment protection of permanent
workers increased odds of early retirement, especially among
workers in poor health. Reduced employment protection of tem-
porary workers increased odds of early retirement and unem-
ployment among workers in poor health as well as workers in
good health. The impact of a reduced employment protection on
unemployment was stronger among lower-educated workers
compared with higher-educated workers.
The finding that a reduction in employment protection levels
within European countries was associated with increased odds of
exit from paid employment supports the evidence from earlier
studies. A longitudinal study among 26 European countries,
analysing national differences in employment protection and
the risk of exit from paid employment, showed that a higher
employment protection level was associated with reduced exit
frompaid employment.17 In addition, two comparative studies of
European countries indicated that in countries with higher
Table 1 Association between individual- and country characteristics and different pathways out of paid employment among employed persons
(n=334 999) in 23 European countries of a rotating panel (EU-SILC) between 2003 and 2014











Mean (SD) OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI)
Age 43.6 (8.2) 0.97 (0.97–0.98) 1.17 (1.04–1.31) 1.04 (1.03–1.06) 0.97 (0.95–0.99) 1.00 (0.99–1.01)
N (%)
Gender
Male 174 581 (51.1) 1 1 1 1 1
Female 160 418 (47.9) 1.09 (0.98–1.20) 1.12 (0.76–1.65) 1.07 (0.89–1.27) 4.87 (3.81–6.23) 1.58 (1.41–1.78)
Education
High 95 070 (28.4) 1 1 1 1 1
Intermediate 159 441 (47.6) 1.76 (1.53–2.01) 1.13 (0.96–1.32) 1.82 (1.59–2.08) 1.28 (1.08–1.51) 1.52 (1.41–1.64)
Low 80 488 (24.0) 2.70 (2.28–3.20) 1.31 (1.01–1.69) 2.81 (2.34–3.36) 2.18 (1.77–2.67) 2.36 (2.14–2.60)
Health
Good 262 243 (78.3) 1 1 1 1 1

















1.37 (1.07–1.76) 6.29 (3.17–12.48) 1.36 (0.82–2.25) 0.99 (0.55–1.78) 1.58 (1.20–2.09)
OLS regression models included individual characteristics (age, sex, education, health) and country characteristics (GDP and employment protection (eprc-v2 or ept-v1)) with fixed effects for
country and year.
EU-SILC, European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions; GDP, gross domestic product; OLS, ordinary least squares.






















employment protection (eg, Sweden), higher employment levels
were found compared with countries with lower employment
protection (eg, United Kingdom).24 25 These earlier studies ana-
lysed differences in employment protection level between coun-
tries, whereas the current study analysed changes in employment
protectionwithin countries. Our model enabled us to control for
time-invariant country-level variables, an improvement over
prior studies that relied on cross-country variation.
Lower-educated workers weremore likely to exit paid employ-
ment, and policy reforms that reduced employment protection
level resulted in increasing gaps in paid employment according to
educational level. Prior evidence suggests that this increased gap
in employment may also increase inequalities in health. For
example, a longitudinal study using EU-SILC data from 28
European countries between 2008 and 2011 found a decrease
in self-rated health after persons became unemployed.10
Likewise, a longitudinal study using EU-SILC data from Italy
between 2007 and 2010 found a worsening of health among
persons who left paid employment.11
Reducing employment protection of permanent workers in
European countries increased exit from paid employment more
among workers in poor health compared with workers in good
health. In concordance with this finding, a longitudinal study
among 26 European countries (EU-SILC data) showed that
a higher employment protection level was associated with smaller
inequalities in the risk of exit from paid employment between
healthy and unhealthy women.17 This suggests that in most coun-
tries, employment protection laws benefit workers in poor health
more than it benefits workers in good health. A potential explana-
tion is the fact that poor health is often a potential cause for
dismissal.18
Our study suggests that higher flexibility in labour contracts
increases the risk of exit from paid employment, but with different
exit routes among different social groups. Exit out of paid employ-
ment mainly occurred through early retirement in all social groups.
Among permanent workers, reduced employment protection
increased early retirement more strongly among workers in poor
health. The fact that impacts are largely on early retirement is of
significant policy relevance, as Governments have increasingly
developed policies to prevent early retirement and encourage work-
ing after the age of 65.32 Prior evidence suggests that early retire-
ment increases the risk of financial hardship later in life.33 Pension
policy reforms over the last two decades have restricted access to
early retirement schemes in most European countries, with the aim
of extending working lives.34 Our findings suggest that these poli-
cies, when paired with reduced employment protection, may have
long-term implications for the financial well-being of workers
approaching pensionable age, particularly for those in poor health.
Among lower-educated workers, a stronger impact of
reduced employment protection of permanent workers on
Table 2 Association between change in employment protection and pathways out of paid employment among employed persons in good or poor
health in 23 European countries of a rotating panel (EU-SILC) between 2003 and 2014
Exit from paid employment
Unemployment Early retirement Disability Economic inactivity All pathways
OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI)
Decrease in employment protection of permanent workers
Among workers in good health 0.85 (0.42–1.74) 2.58 (1.30–5.10) 1.15 (0.61–2.16) 1.24 (0.72–2.14) 1.16 (0.88–1.54)
Among workers in poor health 0.99 (0.49–2.03)* 4.46 (2.26–8.78)* 1.69 (0.98–2.91) 1.15 (0.68–1.95) 1.52 (1.08–2.13)*
Decrease in employment protection of temporary workers
Among workers in good health 1.36 (1.06–1.75) 6.15 (3.09–12.22) 1.29 (0.80–2.10) 1.02 (0.58–1.80) 1.56 (1.18–2.06)
Among workers in poor health 1.40 (1.08–1.80) 6.42 (3.17–13.01) 1.39 (0.83–2.31) 0.92 (0.49–1.73) 1.63 (1.23–2.16)
OLS regression models included age, sex, education, GDP and employment protection×health with fixed effects for country and year.
*Significant interaction employment protection×health (p < 0.05).
See online supplementary table S4 for the value of OR’s for interactions.
EU-SILC, European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions; GDP, gross domestic product; OLS, ordinary least squares.
Table 3 Association between change in employment protection and pathways out of paid employment among higher-, intermediate- or lower-
educated workers in 23 European countries of a rotating panel (EU-SILC) between 2003 and 2014
Increase in exit from paid employment
Unemployment Early retirement Disability Economic inactivity All pathways
OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI)
Decrease in employment protection of permanent workers
Among higher educated workers 0.67 (0.34–1.30) 4.04 (1.88–8.66) 1.23 (0.58–2.57) 1.41 (0.80–2.47) 1.22 (0.91–1.63)
Among intermediate educated workers 0.86 (0.45–1.66) 3.01 (1.41–6.40)* 1.50 (0.84–2.66) 1.27 (0.72–2.25) 1.26 (0.95–1.67)
Among lower educated workers 0.97 (0.46–2.04)* 3.47 (1.79–6.75) 1.61 (0.94–2.75) 1.15 (0.69–1.92) 1.34 (0.94–1.93)
Decrease in employment protection of temporary workers
Among higher educated workers 1.21 (0.95–1.54) 6.21 (2.82–13.66) 1.30 (0.81–2.08) 1.14 (0.68–1.94) 1.53 (1.17–2.00)
Among intermediate educated workers 1.29 (0.99–1.69) 5.74 (2.81–11.74) 1.32 (0.80–2.18) 1.02 (0.57–1.81) 1.50 (1.15–1.96)
Among lower educated workers 1.47 (1.13–1.90)* 6.40 (3.26–12.53) 1.38 (0.83–2.30) 0.94 (0.51–1.75) 1.63 (1.24–2.15)
OLS regression models including age, sex, education, GDP and employment protection×education with fixed effects for country and year.
*Interaction employment protection×education (p<0.05).
See online supplementary table S5 for the value of OR’s for interactions.
EU-SILC, European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions; GDP, gross domestic product; OLS, ordinary least squares.






















unemployment was found compared with higher-educated
workers. Higher-educated workers may avoid unemployment
by choosing or being offered early retirement benefits. It has
been suggested that higher-educated workers have the financial
resources to retire before the statutory age, whereas lower-
educated workers have to rely more on statutory pension
schemes.35 Vulnerable groups, such as lower-educated workers,
may more often become unemployed because they do not have
the necessary economic means to take up early retirement.
Unemployment may mean people would be at higher risk of
poverty and worse health.10
Strengths and limitations
A strength of the current study is the use of comparable long-
itudinal data from a large number of European countries.
Individual longitudinal data on health and employment status
from EU-SILC were combined with information on country-
specific employment protection. However, a limitation of using
EU-SILC data is the variation in mode of data collection, transla-
tions and cultural interpretation.22 The assessment of self-
perceived health has been shown to be useful in evaluating health
status in large epidemiologic studies and has been shown to be
a strong predictor of mortality.36 Comparisons in self-rated
health measures between different cultures do need to be made
with caution.37 A disadvantage was the use of self-reported
employment status, which may differ from registered employ-
ment status and between European countries. For example, non-
employed persons may consider themselves unemployed only
when they are actively looking for work, whereas others on
unemployment benefits may have categorised themselves as eco-
nomically inactive. In addition, it is difficult to distinguish illness-
based retirement from non-illness-based retirement. In the
Nordic countries, ill-health is one of the eligibility criteria for
early retirement.38 Some individuals with illness-based retire-
ment may have categorised themselves as retired instead of
being disabled.
Another strength of the study is the analytical model including
fixed effects for country and year. This removes confounding by
time-invariant country-level unobservable variables and unmea-
sured common trends across all countries. However, country-
specific time-varying confounders remain a threat to causal infer-
ence. If governments have closed the option to exit paid employ-
ment through early retirement during our study, individuals
would by definition be less likely to exit through early retirement.
Therefore, our estimate for early retirement would incorporate
the impact of such reforms. The same reasoning could be valid for
other policies concerning, for example, more stringent eligibility
criteria for disability- or unemployment benefits.
Typically, unemployment benefits do not fall strictly under the
definition of employment protection legislation, which focuses
on laws and regulation that concern procedures and costs asso-
ciated with dismissing individuals or groups of workers and hir-
ing of workers on fixed-term contracts. However, it is possible
that legislation on unemployment benefits may affect the level of
employment protection, for example, if there are collective
agreements that enable certain workers to transit to benefits
without dismissal.
The associations between reforms in EPL on exit from paid
employment were investigated in 23 European countries.
However, the effects of changes in employment protection legis-
lation on exit from paid employment may differ between coun-
tries, depending on their initial level of employment protection.
In countries with a higher level of employment protection,
a decrease in employment protection may have a different effect
compared with countries with a lower level of employment pro-
tection. Future studies should examine heterogeneity across
countries with different institutional characteristics.
The short follow-up period may be considered as a limitation,
as the full effects of changes in EPL on exit from paid employ-
ment may take longer. Therefore, the effect of changes in
employment protection legislation on exit from paid employ-
ment may be different in the medium and longer term.
However, the design of our study with a short follow-up was
deliberate to assess the influence of yearly changes in EPL in
European countries.
Although more lenient employment protection regulations
may increase flows out of employment, they may also increase
flows into employment, for example, because employers are
more incentivised to hire workers that may be more easily dis-
missed. Our study shows that reforms that reduce employment
protection increase the risk of exit from paid employment among
lower-educated workers and workers in poor health. The impact
of legislative changes on entering paid employment is also rele-
vant, but outside the scope of the current study. Further research
is therefore needed to understand the consequences of changes in
employment protection for unemployed persons or those enter-
ing the labour market.
CONCLUSION
Employment protection legislation reforms aiming at flexibilisa-
tion of the labour market increased the risk of early exit from
employment, especially among lower-educated workers and
workers in poor health. Policy measures to protect the employ-
ment of workers in poor health and those with lower education
and in poor health may help reducing their employment
disadvantage.
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What is already known on this subject
► In European countries, higher employment protection is
believed to reduce disadvantage in labour market outcomes
for individuals in poorer health. However, empirical evidence
is limited, with no studies examining how recent reforms to
employment protection laws aimed at ‘flexibilisation’ of the
labour market influence the employment opportunities of
workers in poorer health.
What this study adds
► Employment protection legislation reforms aimed at
flexibilisation of the labour market disproportionately
increase the risk of early exit from paid employment for
workers with lower education and poor health. To reduce
their employment disadvantage, policy measures are needed
to protect employment in these vulnerable groups.
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